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The Eleatic Stranger of Plato’s Sophist suggests that “anything has real 
being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to 
affect [to poiein] anything else or to be affected [to pathein]” (Soph. 
247d–e). For Aristotle of the Categories (2a3–4; CWA I, 4), activity or 
“doing: cutting, burning” and passivity or “being-affected: being-cut, 
being-burned” belong to the ten highest categories. Ever since, the no-
tion of activity and passivity, or to put the issue more colloquially, the 
conviction that a line can be drawn between those things that do or 
make happen and those that undergo has formed part and parcel of the 
Western intellectual outlook. Thus, it is no surprise that it can also be 
found in Descartes’s and Spinoza’s writings, and the distinction receives 
its very own—and rather intricate—definition, E3d2, in the Ethics. In-
deed, Spinoza’s ethical project, according to which the central goal is to 
become as active and as little passive as possible, is closely tied to the 
distinction. Despite this, the crucial definition poses such difficult inter-
pretative problems that it is far from clear what, exactly, Spinoza means 
by activity and passivity.
I will begin this chapter by outlining the basic idea of the definition 
(section 1) and situating it in its historical context (section 2). Then I will 
analyze, and offer a solution to, a problem that has been seen to plague 
Spinoza’s definition of activity (section 3). After this, I will turn my at-
tention to the definition of passivity, discuss a puzzling feature in it, and 
show how my interpretation can throw light on the way in which Spi-
noza thinks about the nature of passive affects or emotions (section 4). 
I hope that the resulting reading increases our understanding of Spinoza’s 
theory of activity and passivity, which underpins much of his moral psy-
chology and his view of happiness.
1. The Definition Outlined
Before defining activity and passivity, Spinoza tells us what he under-
stands by adequate and inadequate cause: “I  call that cause adequate 
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whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call 
it partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be understood through it 
alone.” (E3d1) After this, he defines activity as follows:
I say that we act [agere] when something happens, in us or outside 
us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by d1), when something 
in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and 
distinctly understood through it alone.
(E3d2)
So, hardly surprisingly, action is a causally potent notion; in Spinoza’s 
technical usage, a thing is said to be active when it is the sole, complete, 
or total cause of an effect: a causal factor in addition to which nothing 
else is needed for the effect to be realized. And as it is an axiom for Spi-
noza that effects are known through their causes (E1a4), in such a case 
there is only one cause of the effect, namely the agent, on whom knowl-
edge concerning the effect depends.
Things become complicated, though, when attention is drawn to 
the fact that the definition contains a crucial explicative reference to 
what “follows from our nature,” that is, from our essence. The same 
phrase is, conspicuously enough, to be found also in the definition of 
passivity:
On the other hand, I say that we are acted on [pati] when something 
happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we 
are only a partial cause.
(E3d2)
In other words, that something follows from a thing’s nature is funda-
mental for both activity and passivity and thus a basic ingredient in any 
kind of causal occurrence. Here it is helpful to note that also E1p16, 
the pivotal proposition arguably explicating the nature of God’s activ-
ity, contains a reference to what follows from the essence, “[f]rom the 
necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in 
infinitely many modes” (E1p16). The demonstration begins with the con-
tention, “[t]his Proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends 
to the fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing a 
number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e., from 
the very essence of the thing)” (E1p16d).
We can start unpacking these claims by observing that they presuppose 
a specific theory of definable essences (or natures).1 A detailed discussion 
of this intricate theory and its implications is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but simplifying matters slightly the basic idea can be presented 
as follows.2 Each and every thing, including God, has its own particular 
essence that constitutes the thing; the essence is thoroughly intelligible, 
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it can be perfectly captured by a definition. Both the essence and the 
definition have a certain structure: from the definition certain properties 
can be inferred, and this expresses those things that necessarily follow 
from—are realized by—the essence in question. Much here is part and 
parcel of the philosophical landscape of Spinoza’s times, but it should be 
noted that a specific feature of his thought strongly pushes him to think 
in this way, namely the conviction that geometrical objects reveal in an 
exemplary fashion the inner structure of things. He famously states that 
an infinity of things follow from God’s essence “by the same necessity 
and in the same way” (E1p17s) as from the essence of a triangle follows 
the property of having internal angles summing to two right angles. Re-
gardless of how much of this is for us immediately transparent, there is 
one certain conclusion for us to draw: each and every true Spinozistic 
thing is causally efficacious by virtue of its essence. This is confirmed by 
such later claims as “[n]othing exists from whose nature some effect does 
not follow” (E1p36).3
It may thus be said that we act in the same sense as God does when an 
effect follows by necessity from our nature alone, that is, when we have 
power to bring about that effect with no contribution from other causes. 
This is the basic meaning of acting. Moreover, while E3d2 reveals that 
also patients contribute to the causal process in which they are involved, 
Spinoza still thinks it makes sense to talk about the active and passive 
aspects of a causal phenomenon. Thus, I believe it is safe to preliminarily 
outline the basic idea of the definition to be as follows: in action, the ef-
fect is brought about by the essence of one thing alone, whereas passions 
involve the essential efficacy of more than one thing.
2. Contextualizing the Definition
To understand Spinoza’s definition of activity and passivity, it is helpful to 
take a look at what Descartes and Hobbes, his immediate predecessors, 
and Aristotelian scholastics, the bearers of the traditionally dominant 
philosophical outlook, say about the topic. Of course, many other con-
texts could be suggested; but I hope to show that the ones I have chosen 
are particularly apt to throw light on how Spinoza thinks about the issue.
Descartes famously asserts in the very first article of The Passions of 
the Soul that:
[W]hatever takes place or occurs is generally called by philosophers 
a “passion” with regard to the subject to which it happens and an 
“action” with regard to that which makes it happen. Thus, although 
an agent and patient are often quite different, an action and passion 
must always be a single thing which has these two names on account 
of the two different subjects to which it may be related.
(CSM I, 328)
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So the agent and the patient do not have to be different things but usually 
are,4 in which case we are dealing with a phenomenon that has both an 
active and a passive aspect.5 Hobbes proceeds along similar lines:
A BODY is said to work upon or act, that is to say, do something 
to another body, when it either generates or destroys some accident 
in it: and the body in which an accident is generated or destroyed is 
said to suffer, that is, to have something done to it by another body; 
as when one body by putting forwards another body generates mo-
tion in it, it is called the AGENT; and the body in which motion is so 
generated, is called the PATIENT; so fire that warms the hand is the 
agent, and the hand, which is warmed, is the patient. That accident, 
which is generated in the patient, is called the EFFECT.
(DCo II.9.1)
So what we have is a production or destruction of an accident as the ef-
fect of the interaction between two or more causally efficacious things—
the agent(s) and the patient; the thing in which the accident is generated 
(and hence in which the accident inheres) is passive; the other thing(s) in-
volved is active.6 Moreover, Hobbes (DCo II.9.3) seems to disregard the 
possibility that the agent and the patient could be the one and same thing.
Already a quick look reveals that Spinoza’s definition differs from the 
ones just cited in its reference to natures of things as the sources of ac-
tivity and passivity—it seems that Descartes and Hobbes are not com-
mitted, at least as far as their understanding of activity and passivity is 
concerned, to anything like the essentialism to which Spinoza is so eager 
to refer. Because of this and despite the fact that Spinoza’s essentialism in 
many notable ways differs from the traditionally dominant Peripatetic es-
sentialism, it is worthwhile to relate his conception of action and passion 
to the one developed by Aristotelian scholastics.
The following general formulation offers a useful initial approximation 
of the scholastic position: when a substance acts upon another substance 
to bring about a certain state of affairs, it is active (an agent), the sub-
stance acted upon passive (patient).7 However, the metaphysical ground-
ing of activity and passivity is a thorny issue, with different scholastic 
authors defending (more or less) differing positions. It is nevertheless 
clear that hylomorphism (according to which substances are composites 
of substantial form and prime matter) and the teleological framework 
(with its distinction between potentiality and actuality) underpin all of 
the Aristotelian-scholastic theories, however much may they differ in de-
tails. It is safe to say that, within the Peripatetic framework, passivity 
pertains to the matter side of the hylomorphic composite, whereas activ-
ity pertains to form.8 Now prime matter is completely passive; as one 
medieval thinker puts it, prime matter can be said to possess infinite pas-
sivity, for it can take up any form.9 This is in keeping with Aristotle, who 
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states that “matter is potentiality, form actuality” (De anima 412a9–10; 
CWA I, 656); and since “actuality is the action” (Metaphysics 1050a22; 
CWA II, 1658), the role of (substantial) forms can be characterized as fol-
lows: “[S]ubstantial forms are the primary agents in the sublunary natu-
ral world. They both determine the superficial appearance of things, and 
account for a thing’s unity and persistence.” (Pasnau 2011, 564) Indeed, 
substantial forms are those principles of action by virtue of which things 
behave and change the way they characteristically do.10 Acting equals 
realizing the form, and doing this leads eventually to the actualization 
of the telos. Since form is a constituent of a thing’s essence it can be said 
that, for Aristotelians, action is essence-originating behavior.
With regard to passivity, the following passage is important: while dis-
cussing different kinds of potentiality, Aristotle remarks that “one kind 
is a potentiality for being acted on, i.e. the principle in the very thing 
acted on, which makes it capable of being changed and acted on by an-
other thing or by itself regarded as other” (Metaphysics 1046a11–13; 
CWA I, 1651, emphasis added). Susan James captures this very well by 
stating that “things are passive in so far as they have the potentiality 
to be changed by other things for better or worse, and in all cases this 
potentiality is both made possible and limited by what Aristotle calls the 
principle of the thing in question” (James 1997, 33).11 Now, what is here 
meant by the “principle of the thing” is not altogether clear, but, obvi-
ously, it has to do with something intrinsic to the thing in question. Thus, 
also passivity involves the hylomorphically conceived essence or at least 
something that necessarily belongs to the thing in virtue of that essence.
For our purposes the important point to be extracted from this ex-
amination is that, whatever their exact nature may be, the Aristotelian 
conception of action and passion is essentialist in character: whether we 
are considering an agent or a patient, explaining behavior requires refer-
ence to the essential principles. Accordingly, despite his antiteleological 
tendencies, Spinoza’s essentialist conception of action and passion seems 
to be in this respect closer than those of Descartes and Hobbes to the 
Peripatetic view of activity and passivity. However, I hope to have shown 
that Spinoza has reasons of his own, stemming from his model of causa-
tion, to include the reference to natures in E3d2. I believe it is correct to 
say that Spinoza attempts to present a novel form of essentialism, one 
purged of teleology, and that this can also be seen in the way he defines 
activity and passivity.
3. The Problem of Activity
3.1 The Puzzling Definition
Given the centrality of E3d2, it is no surprise that it has received its fair 
share of attention. We can begin our examination by considering Michael 
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Della Rocca’s claim that a cause can come “to be able to be active to a 
greater degree with regard to a certain effect,”12 which implies that there 
can be less-than-complete causes that are nevertheless active and whose 
degree of activity can vary over time. Although this view is, in itself, quite 
plausible, it is uncertain whether Spinoza would be ready to endorse it. 
He seems to be thrust toward a position according to which the criterion 
of action and activity is being the entire cause of an effect: if a given effect 
e does not follow from x’s essence alone, then e does not qualify to be x’s 
action at all. This is most probably the reason why Spinoza nowhere ex-
plicitly refers to things’ less-than-complete degrees of activity with regard 
to a certain effect.
Most importantly, the aforesaid signals an acute problem pertaining 
to Spinoza’s doctrine of causation: the criterion of activity he formulates 
seems to be far too strict, for it leaves us with the following problem. In 
cases in which x causes a passion in y, for instance when a tennis player 
hits the tennis ball, the effect, namely the ball’s movement (which is the 
ball’s passion), is a joint product of the player and the ball, and cannot 
therefore count as an action of the player. This implies that in this kind 
of situations the cause which we would be strongly inclined to regard as 
the agent does not, at least prima facie, meet Spinoza’s requirements of 
agency. And this means that although, for instance in the tennis example, 
Spinoza’s definition of passivity captures quite well the situation of the 
ball, it is hard to know what to say about the player. It is simply counter-
intuitive to classify her, too, as a patient; in fact and accordingly, it seems 
that Spinoza disqualifies her from being one by the “when something 
happens in us” clause of the definition of passivity, since the effect does 
not inhere in her. But then again, as the effect (the ball’s motion) is not 
caused by the player’s essence alone, she does not meet the requirement 
Spinoza sets for the agent, either. Martha Kneale has noticed what I think 
is the source of this problem and formulates it as follows:
One surprising proposition is involved in Definition II, namely, that 
something can happen outside a given mode which can be clearly 
and distinctly understood in terms of the nature of that mode alone. 
This is surprising because the general doctrine of Part II of the Ethics 
seems to imply that any transaction involving two or more modes 
can be fully understood only in terms of the nature of all of them.13
Although this passage dates already from the 1970s, no-one, to my 
knowledge, has explicitly attempted to give an answer to Kneale. Paul 
Hoffman has more recently noted the same issue, although without refer-
ring to Kneale, and frames it very well:
For us to act on something outside us entails that something which 
happens outside us can be clearly and distinctly understood through 
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our nature alone, but that would seem to be impossible, since some-
thing happens outside us only if something else is at least a partial 
cause of it. But it seems paradoxical to say, what Spinoza’s defini-
tions of action and passion seem to entail, that we never act on any-
thing else, but instead always undergo something, when we are the 
partial cause of something outside us.14
This makes us face what I would call the activity puzzle: how can we be 
the adequate cause of an effect outside us?
The problem at hand is not a minor one, for it seems to plague every 
case of intermodificationary causation, or transeunt causation taking 
place between finite modes (for instance when a moving billiard ball hits 
another ball at rest, causing it to move); in other words, only intramodi-
ficationary (or immanent) causation, that is, when a finite x produces an 
effect in itself, seems with certainty to count as a Spinozistic action, for 
then the effect results from x’s essence alone. I presume the paradigmatic 
instance of this would be mental action, for instance forming an idea of 
the essence of a geometrical figure in one’s mind and deriving other ideas 
from that idea, namely ideas of those properties that necessarily follow 
from the figure’s nature.
3.2 Previous Attempts to Solve the Problem
One rather obvious way of trying to solve this problem is to accept that 
only partial causes are to be found in any intermodificationary causal 
occurrence but that it is still possible to identify certain partial causes as 
agents, others as patients. Actually, Della Rocca’s talk about “the greater 
degree” of activity with regard to a given effect points to this direction: 
it implies that x can be both (1) a partial cause of e and (2) active with 
regard to e, that is, that activity and partiality do not exclude each other. 
So maybe Spinoza’s idea can be interpreted to be as follows. Given that 
he says that we “act when something happens, in us or outside us, of 
which we are the adequate cause” (E3d2), in transeunt causation the 
“something” being adequately caused cannot be the total effect (e.g. the 
tennis ball’s motion) but only the aspect of the effect that follows from 
the agent’s nature alone (e.g. the impact given to the ball by the tennis 
player, transferring a certain magnitude of kinetic energy to the ball). 
This makes sense, but leaves us with the question of how—since neither 
one of the causal relata is the complete cause of the total effect—can we 
identify the agent side and the patient side of the causal occurrence?
Here it is helpful to consider the context formed by Spinoza’s most 
immediate predecessors. The answer they would give to this question is, 
I think, clear: both Descartes and Hobbes emphasize that a causal occur-
rence is a whole involving both an agent and a patient, and the patient 
is the one in which the effect takes place or inheres. This is evinced by 
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Descartes’s contention that an occurrence is “a ‘passion’ with regard to 
the subject to which it happens and an ‘action’ with regard to that which 
makes it happen” (CSM I, 328, emphasis added),15 and by Hobbes’s as-
sertion that “when one body by putting forwards another body generates 
motion in it, it is called the AGENT; and the body in which motion is so 
generated, is called the PATIENT [. . .][.] That accident, which is gener-
ated in the patient, is called the EFFECT” (DCo II.9.1, emphases added).
Could Spinoza’s definition of activity and passivity be interpreted in a 
similar fashion? Would it be consistent with his definition to hold that 
in transeunt causation all causal relata are only partial causes, but the 
patient is marked off by being the relatum whose state is being altered; 
all other relata are agents? Now the trouble is that if E3d2 is taken as 
it stands, it is not evident that the answer to this question can be affir-
mative: in the solution just proposed, also the thing in which the newly 
produced state inheres can be said to cause adequately a certain aspect 
of the causing (e.g. from the tennis ball’s nature it follows that it has a 
certain kind of elastic structure, for its part responsible for the motion 
the ball acquires after having been hit by the player),16 and this means 
that since Spinoza allows that the effect adequately brought about by the 
agent can happen not only outside but also in it, also the thing in which 
the state inheres would qualify as a Spinozistic agent with regard to the 
component of the total effect it produces. This in a sense short-circuits 
Spinoza’s definition and leaves us with no unambiguous way of distin-
guishing agents from patients.
There is another kind of solution offered by Hoffman. It runs as follows:
[S]omething’s following from my nature alone is not, on Spinoza’s 
view, incompatible with its following solely from the nature of some 
external thing that affects me. Insofar as an external thing affects me 
through some property I have in common with it (and that prop-
erty need not even be a common property, that is, a property that is 
equally in the part and in the whole) something happens in me which 
follows from my nature alone, but it also follows from the nature 
of the external thing. Thus although the external thing is acting on 
me, I  am also acting, not undergoing something. So acting is not 
necessarily contrasted with being affected by something external; it 
is contrasted only with undergoing, and undergoing involves being 
affected by (or affecting) something external through a property that 
the things do not have in common.17
Now it is undeniable that the relata of transeunt causation must have some-
thing in common in order to enter into causal relation with each other; 
at the very least, they must be things of the same attribute (E4p29d).18 
And it is true that according to Spinoza, causal occurrences can be de-
picted in terms of agreements and disagreements: when something acts 
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on us through what it has in common with us, it agrees with us and can 
only produce joy in us (E4p30—p31); whereas people torn by passions 
can disagree with and thereby be contrary to each other, which gives rise 
to sadness (E4p33—p34). However, as far as I know, Spinoza nowhere 
uses these ideas in a way that would address, even in passing, the distinc-
tion between activity and passivity. Moreover, as Hoffman admits, it is 
an implication of his position that when x affects y through a property 
they do not have in common, x also undergoes something. But this surely 
sounds strange: whenever x affects y—regardless of how this happens—I 
take it that we would understand the verb “to affect” in such a way that 
we would want to say that x is the agent, y the patient.19 Due to these 
troubles, I think we should look further still for an interpretation of Spi-
noza’s notion of activity.
3.3 The Definition Newly Explicated
To my mind, the source of the difficulties thus far encountered is that 
Spinoza fails to make his definition complex enough to accommodate 
both immanent and transeunt causation. It is as if he simply used his 
understanding of God’s causality to define activity, just adding the ad-
ditional “outside us” remark. But as such claims as E1p18 make clear, 
Spinoza’s model of causation is, in fact, an account of one kind of imma-
nent causation, and, as the problems just encountered indicate, as such 
it cannot be used for defining intermodificationary causation, which 
is one kind of transeunt causation, without a considerable amount of 
revision work.
I do, however, think that Spinoza can be interpreted as trying to articu-
late in E3d2 the following rather understandable line of thought concern-
ing activity. First, in immanent modal causation, that is, when a finite 
thing brings about something in itself, it is the adequate, or entire, cause 
of the effect and hence necessarily active; no patient is involved. Second, 
in transeunt modal causation, that is, in causation taking place between 
finite modifications, all causal relata contribute adequately to a certain 
aspect of the resultant total effect, and the relatum in which the effect 
inheres can be called the patient, others agents.
This reading takes it for granted that the distinction between activity 
and passivity is exhaustive, that is, that each and every cause must fall 
into either category. However, it may be claimed that perhaps Spinoza 
does not regard the distinction as such, and hence it is not a problem 
that he does not tell us what we should call a thing that is in a causal 
process (1) a partial cause (and hence not active) but nevertheless (2) not 
the bearer of the effect (and hence very uneasily classified as passive). 
Moreover, this lacuna could be regarded as unimportant, for instance 
because in cases in which several things together bring about something it 
is not always easy to say whether or not they should count as agents (for 
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instance, when a vast number of people stand on a bridge and thereby 
make it collapse),20 or because these kind of cases are not at the core 
of the moral life celebrated in the Ethics. In other words, the status of 
cases in which we accomplish something together with other causes (for 
instance, when a tennis player learns to hit the ball hard and accurately) 
is unclear; it might be justified to see them as insignificant for Spinozistic 
ethics, ultimately very much focused on intellectual activity.
However, mainly because Spinoza’s predecessors do not even hint that 
there could be room for causes that are neither active nor passive and 
hence seem to regard the distinction as exhaustive, it seems simply too 
big a leap to claim that Spinoza entertains—without anywhere explicitly 
confessing to do so—the idea that there are non-passive but still par-
tial causes that fall somewhere in between agents and patients. After all, 
Descartes states in no uncertain terms: “[W]hatever is not an action is a 
passion.” (CSMK, 270) Further, an opponent of the exhaustive reading 
should still spell out Spinoza’s reasons for including the “outside us” 
passage in the definition of action, which does not seem to be an easy 
task, for anything taking place outside a supposedly active thing seems to 
inevitably involve causal factors other than the thing’s nature, hence de-
barring it from being an agent in the proper Spinozistic sense. Moreover, 
the “in us or outside us” passage could be interpreted as referring to both 
immanent (“in us”) and transeunt (“outside us”) causation, and if this is 
what Spinoza has in mind, it at least suggests that E3d2 is supposed to 
cover all kinds of causal relations.
To summarize, solving the activity puzzle requires elaborating the 
activity—passivity distinction in a way that is fine-grained enough to 
take into account the profound difference between immanent and tran-
seunt causation. Although this is not the most parsimonious interpreta-
tive path to take and makes defining activity and passivity a relatively 
complex affair, I believe that it not only captures quite well what Spi-
noza is attempting to say but also gives him conceptual resources to dis-
tinguish between agents and patients in instances of transeunt causation 
(such as the one depicted by the tennis example). So, in immanent causa-
tion the effect is brought about by the agent’s power alone; in transeunt 
causation, both the agent and the patient are causally efficacious, and 
the resulting effect inheres in the latter.21 I think that Spinoza’s failure to 
give an adequate formulation to his thoughts could well stem from his 
strong commitment to the monistic framework: as far as God’s causal-
ity and activity are concerned, the perplexities plaguing finite causation 
simply do not come up. In fact, given Spinoza’s general metaphysical 
outlook, it seems he should be constantly reminding us that causation 
can be adequately conceived only from the monistic viewpoint accord-
ing to which all talk of transeunt finite causation should be, as it were, 
translated into talk of God’s immanent causation—our outside is, after 
all, God’s inside.
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4. The Problem of Passivity
4.1 The Puzzling Definition
We have seen that Spinoza endorses an essentialist view of causality in 
which essences operate as centers of causal efficacy: effects follow from 
the natures of things, as their properties.22 Spinoza refers to this also 
when defining passivity; recall: “I say that we are acted on when some-
thing happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we 
are only a partial cause” (E3d2, emphasis added). However, this gives 
rise to the following conundrum. It would seem that if something follows 
from our nature, then we are its complete, or only, cause. But this would 
go against the very idea of passivity as something that always involves at 
least two things, the agent and the patient—which is arguably why Spi-
noza thinks that the reference to being “only a partial cause” is in order. 
The problem is thus: how can passions both follow from our nature and 
be only partially caused by us?23
Here it may be pointed out that Spinoza says that when an action fol-
lows from our nature, it can be understood through that nature alone 
(E3d2), but he does not say the same of passions. However, this only 
pushes the problem one step further: if something follows from our na-
ture, as any passion does, how could it not be adequately understood 
through that nature alone?
The key to answering the aforementioned questions lies in finding out 
how something can follow from our nature so that adequate cognition of 
it requires understanding not only our nature but something else, namely 
the external cause, as well. Here it is singularly helpful to turn to what 
may be called Spinoza’s theory of constitution,24 according to which one 
and the same essence can be, and in fact is, differently constituted, as the 
causal context varies: “[A]s each [man] is affected by external causes with 
this or that species of Joy, Sadness, Love, Hate, etc.—i.e., as his nature 
is constituted in one way or the other, so his Desires vary” (E3p56d, 
emphasis added). “[B]y an affection of the human essence we understand 
any constitution of that essence, whether it is innate [NS: or has come 
from outside]” (E3defaff1exp). These passages explicate being affected 
by external causes (i.e. being passive) in terms of one’s nature or essence 
changing its constitution. When an external cause affects us without de-
stroying us, it does not alter our essence (that would equal our destruction 
(E4pr)), only (re)determines its constitution. Now understanding how a 
new constitution comes about requires cognition not only of our own 
nature but also the nature of the external cause(s),25 but once an essence 
is constituted in a specific way, certain properties as effects necessarily 
follow from it. This can be illustrated geometrically. There are many 
different kinds of triangles: equilateral, isosceles, right-angled, scalene, 
etc. Now each of these can be conceived of as the triangle constituted in 
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a certain way: equilaterally, isosceles-wise, right-anglely, scalenely. Let 
us take a triangle constituted equilaterally: from its essence necessarily 
follows the property of equiangularity—there cannot be an equilateral 
triangle without this property. Now if we change the triangle’s constitu-
tion to a right-angled one, the property of equiangularity does not follow 
from its nature; instead we have the property of fulfilling the Pythagorean 
theorem (which in turn does not follow from the nature of the equilateral 
triangle).
The aforesaid indicates that Spinoza’s theory of the passions is built on 
the idea that external causes act on us by determining the constitution of 
our essence. To understand a passion we need to understand the external 
cause and our nature,26 and from the latter as determined by the former 
the passion follows. This is what he means, I would argue, by saying 
that the basic kinds of passive emotions or affects—desires, joys, and 
sadnesses—arise from certain external causes: “We say that we are acted 
on when something arises [oritur] in us of which we are only the partial 
cause (by 3d2), that is (by 3d1), something which cannot be deduced 
from the laws of our nature alone” (E4p2). That Spinoza really has the 
geometry-inspired essence–property structure in view when he analyzes 
the emotions is confirmed in a late scholium of the fourth part of the Eth-
ics, which offers a valuable elaboration of the mission statement of E3pr, 
of considering emotions “just like other natural things”: the aim is “to 
demonstrate the nature and properties of things,” and the things he says 
to follow from the affect of pride he has just discussed follow from it “as 
necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles 
are equal to two right angles” (E4p57s). Consistently enough, the same 
model also applies to emotions themselves as properties endowed with 
their essences from which different effects follow as the causal context 
varies: “[F]rom the same property of human nature from which it follows 
that men are compassionate, it also follows that the same men are envi-
ous and ambitious” (E3p32s).
In Spinoza’s analyses of passive emotions, external causes as proximate 
causes figure prominently,27 which is in keeping with the methodological 
strictures set already in the early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intel-
lect (TIE). The first criterion of a good definition is that it should “include 
the proximate cause” (TIE § 96; C I, 39) by which the defined thing is 
produced. Spinoza thinks, quite traditionally, that to understand some-
thing is to know its causes, or the way in which it is generated. The other 
criterion of a good definition is that “all the thing’s properties can be 
deduced from it” (TIE § 96; C I, 40). Accordingly, an adequate definition 
of a specific emotion must state (1) the external cause as the proximate 
cause that determines the constitution of our essence and (2) the emotion 
that follows as the property of that essence. This explains why Spinoza 
defines passivity the way he does: even though a passion follows from a 
determinately constituted essence, it cannot be adequately understood 
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through that essence alone; for that, knowledge of the determining proxi-
mate cause is required as well.
4.2 The Nature of Passive Emotions
The present interpretation of passivity invites us to reconsider Spinoza’s 
understanding of passive emotions. We have thus far been focusing on 
causes, essences, and properties. However, the issue could also be framed 
in dynamic terms: as God’s modifications all finite things express God’s 
power, which makes them intrinsically powerful strivers (E3p6–p7). In 
this framework, the agent can be said to determine the intrinsic power of 
the patient so that that power is exercised in a certain way. To the extent 
that this intrinsic power of ours is not hindered, it is what Spinoza calls 
power of acting.28
Spinoza acknowledges that passive emotions are not necessar-
ily harmful: they can be both negative and positive, emotions of sad-
ness and of joy.29 Andrea Sangiacomo has claimed that my account, 
by stressing the geometrical model and the essentialism it involves the 
way it does, is vulnerable to the following criticism: “[S]hould power of 
acting consist in nothing but bringing about what follows from our es-
sence alone, Spinoza would not be entitled to claim that external causes 
can increase our power of acting by determining our nature. From this 
point of view, in fact, ‘joyful passions’ [. . .] would be inconceivable.”30 
Indeed, Sangiacomo seems to think that I and Don Garrett conceive of 
external causes “only as a possible threat, at best, for activity.”31 But as 
Sangiacomo correctly points out, this cannot be the case, since Spinoza 
often talks about passions having a positive effect on our power of act-
ing. So how can the thus far presented interpretation account for the 
nature of passive emotions, especially joyful ones, external causes give 
rise to in us?
The notion of power of acting is connected to the idea of being com-
pletely active: to the completely unimpeded use of our intrinsic power so 
that we are totally self-determined, only cause effects that can be under-
stood through our nature alone. For us limited beings, this is something 
unreachable, for “[i]t is impossible that a man should not be a part of 
Nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those 
which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which 
he is the adequate cause” (E4p4). Given that we can be active but never 
completely so, it is all a matter of degree here: at any given moment, many 
things follow from our nature, and to the extent that following is to be 
understood through our nature alone, we are active and self-determined. 
However, given that we are deeply connected to the causal network of 
the universe, it seems evident that, at least usually, most things we do and 
feel are passions, determined by the interaction between our nature and 
the nature of the external causes affecting us.
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According to the present geometry-inspired model the nature of pas-
sive emotions is to be understood as follows. Let us assume that being 
constituted equilaterally is what a triangle would be in a state of com-
plete self-determination. Next, think of the triangle being constituted sca-
lenely, which is a state far removed from the self-determined one. Should 
there be an external cause that determines it to a right-angled constitu-
tion, the triangle would reach a state in which it is more self-determined 
than before; consequently, that transition, should the triangle be capable 
of emotions, would give rise to the passion of joy. The triangle is still not 
completely self-determined: for instance, it still does not have the prop-
erty of equiangularity. When things are taken to the reverse direction so 
that constitutions further removed from the self-determined one result, 
humans (and other sentient creatures)32 undergo passions of sadness. Tri-
angles are entia rationis,33 and as such without causal power,34 but for 
real Spinozistic things the aforesaid can be expressed in dynamic terms 
as follows. External causes determine the extent to which the intrinsic 
power of things is exerted passively or actively; they can increase things’ 
power of acting by determining them to be closer to the constitution in 
which they would be completely active and self-determined. In such a 
case, the powers of things can certainly be said to be combined;35 it is 
an overarching contention of Spinoza’s moral psychology that a definite 
dynamics determines the character of our emotional lives. But we should 
not forget that whether things are useful or harmful to, or agree or dis-
agree with, each other depends on the constitution of their natures,36 
and what exactly the thing determined brings about with its power is 
ultimately fixed by its essence—constitution—property structure.37 This 
makes, for Spinoza, his essentialism in at least one important respect 
more explanatory than his dynamism (i.e. the view that things are essen-
tially dynamic entities interacting with each other).
The aforesaid has remained at a very abstract level and raises the 
question, how does the fundamental constitutional architecture of emo-
tional dynamics appear on the phenomenological level? In the third and 
fourth parts of the Ethics, Spinoza’s analysis of passive emotions operates 
within what may be termed the familiar parallelist framework in which 
increases or decreases in our power of acting are explicated both in men-
tal and physical terms. He himself gives the following example that illus-
trates particularly well the way in which differing constitutions underpin 
our perfectly quotidian psychophysical operations:
For example, when we imagine something which usually pleases us 
by its taste, we desire to enjoy it—that is, to consume it. But while we 
thus enjoy it, the stomach is filled, and the body constituted differ-
ently. So if (while the body is now differently disposed) the presence 
of the food or drink encourages the image of it, and consequently 
also the striving, or desire to consume it, then that new constitution 
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will be opposed to this desire, or striving. Hence, the presence of the 
food or drink we used to want will be hateful. This is what we call 
disgust and weariness.
(E3p59s)
In cases like this, the essence of our mind and body does not change, it 
is just constituted anew, with the corresponding disposition of the body, 
imaginative ideas of the mind, and such emotions as an appetite, or a 
disgust, for food and drink.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, I hope to have established that the puzzle concerning Spino-
za’s definition of activity can be solved by taking into account its historical 
context and by making explicit what is left implicit in the E3d2, namely 
the distinction between immanent and transeunt causation. The source 
of the difficulties lies, I have suggested, in Spinoza’s monistic mindset to 
which transeunt causation is in a sense more foreign than immanent cau-
sation. As for Spinoza’s definition of passivity, I have argued that it turns 
out to be quite understandable if we acknowledge that external causes 
cause can, and most often do, (re)determine the constitution of our es-
sence, from which essence passions then necessarily follow even though 
adequate knowledge of those passions require knowledge not only of our 
essence but also of external things as proximate causes. According to this 
geometry-inspired theory of emotions, the basic causal architecture of 
such quotidian feelings as hunger, thirst, anger, and gratitude is formed 
by transitions from one constitution to another.38
Notes
  1  As far as I can see, Spinoza uses the notions of essence and nature inter-
changeably. For the view that the same does not apply to Descartes, see Debo-
rah Brown’s contribution to this volume.
  2  For my detailed account of the theory, see Viljanen 2011, 8–21, 44–46.
  3  I defend a specific interpretation of this claim in Viljanen 2011, chs. 2–3 and 
label Spinoza’s view dynamic essentialism (ibid., 73–82). However, it should 
be noted that in its general outlines, the position I endorse is nowadays wide-
spread in scholarship; see e.g. Garrett 2002, 150; Lin 2006, 343.
  4  Descartes of the Passions, of course, states that there are also pure mental 
actions, namely volitions “which terminate in the soul itself” (CSM I, 335). 
This kind of volitions do not involve a patient.
  5  On action and passion in Descartes, see also Brown’s contribution to this 
volume.
  6  In other words, the activity of x and the passivity of y—both evidently repre-
senting different types of causal efficacy, namely active and passive power—
together result in the accident as the effect. So the accident is certainly one 
thing, but activity and passivity pertain to different entities. As we will see 
below, Spinoza views what is called transeunt causation rather similarly.
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  7  Here I am following Alfred Freddoso: “Typically, substances (agents) act 
upon other substances (patients) to bring about or actualize or produce states 
of affairs (effects)” (Freddoso 1988, 79).
  8  Cf. e.g. Des Chene 1996, 161–62.
  9  The thinker in question is Albert of Saxony (Pasnau 2011, 40).
 10  See, e.g., Lear 1988, 33; Des Chene 1996, 65–66; Ariew and Gabbey 1998, 
429–31; Pasnau 2011, 561–63.
 11  Emphases added. See also Ariew and Gabbey 1998, 430.
 12  Della Rocca 1996, 211. Charlie Huenemann seems to agree: “[W]e can par-
cel out the portions of its [the body’s] behavior that are due to the body’s 
own powers, and speak of the extent to which a body’s behavior is self- 
determined” (Huenemann 2008, 102).
 13  Kneale 1976, 217.
 14  Hoffman 1991, 178.
 15  See, however, note 4 in this chapter.
 16  For a similar line of thought, see Rice 1992.
 17  Hoffman 1991, 178–79.
 18  Thereby Spinoza avoids the main problem plaguing Descartes’s interaction-
ism.
 19  Here we would have the Western tradition on our side, as Plato’s Eleatic 
Stranger quoted in the beginning of this chapter testifies.
 20  I owe this example to Koistinen. However, it seems to me that there is no 
shortage of cases (such as a group of people lifting a heavy object together) 
in which it is quite natural to identify some of the causal factors involved as 
active, others as passive.
 21  Again, it should be recalled that the same distinction, although not stated 
explicitly, forms part of the Cartesian framework; see note 4 in this chapter.
 22  Cf.: “[E]ffect, or property” (E3defaff22exp).
 23  To my knowledge, there is no discussion in the literature of this problem, per-
haps simply because until fairly recently not much attention has been given to 
Spinoza’s essentialist understanding of causation.
 24  For my earlier exposition of this theory, see Viljanen 2011, 151–57.
 25  As E3p56d explains, “the nature of each passion must necessarily be so ex-
plained that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed.”
 26  It should be noted that external causes are causally efficacious through their 
essences, the constitution of the patient being the joint product of the patient’s 
essence and the external cause(s) essence(s).
 27  Since Spinoza assumes the human nature—like any nature—as such to be 
unchangeable, it is understandable that his catalogue of the passions is struc-
tured around the different kind of proximate causes, or external causes that 
affect us: “There are as many species of joy, sadness, and desire, and con-
sequently of each affect composed of these [. . .] or derived from them (like 
love, hate, hope, fear, etc.), as there are species of objects by which we are 
affected” (E3p56).
 28  For a detailed discussion of this, see Viljanen 2011, 77–82.
 29  Moreover, we should not forget that there are also active emotions, which 
can only be joyful.
 30  Sangiacomo 2015, 532n29.
 31  Sangiacomo 2015, 539. Sangiacomo refers to Garrett 2002; Viljanen 2011, 
125–32.
 32  See E3p57s.
 33  See letter 83 (C II, 487).
 34  For more on this, see Viljanen 2011, 62n31.
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 35  This is something Sangiacomo 2015 emphasizes; see, e.g., E4p18s.
 36  This, as I see it, is the force of E4p30–p35: humans often disagree with each 
other despite the fact that in themselves (as constituted rationally) their na-
tures necessarily agree.
 37  Here I agree with Justin Steinberg, although he puts his point in terms differ-
ent from mine: “The emotion marks a kind of structural change; the desire is 
the functional effect of this change” (Steinberg 2016, 75).
 38  I would like to begin by expressing my deepest gratitude to Juhani Pietarinen, 
whom I miss very much, for many helpful and inspiring discussions also on the 
topics of this chapter. I would also like to thank Lilli Alanen for so generously 
hosting me in Uppsala in 2008: some parts of this chapter hark back to that 
visit. Many thanks also to Olli Koistinen, Arto Repo, the Helsinki History of 
Philosophy Research Seminar, and the Turku Rationalist Club for constructive 
comments on the chapter. Special thanks to Justin Steinberg for detailed written 
comments, and to the editors of this volume for several insightful suggestions. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge that the work on this chapter has been 
financially supported by the Academy of Finland (project number 275583).
References
Ariew, Roger, and Alan Gabbey. 1998. “The Scholastic Background.” In The 
Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, vol. I, edited by Daniel 
Garber and Michael Ayers, 425–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aristotle. 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation 
I—II, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. =CWA.
Della Rocca, Michael. 1996. “Spinoza’s Metaphysical Psychology.” In The Cam-
bridge Companion to Spinoza, edited by Don Garrett, 192–266. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Des Chene, Dennis. 1996. Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian 
and Cartesian Thought. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Freddoso, Alfred J. 1988. “Medieval Causation and the Case against Secondary 
Causation in Nature.” In Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphys-
ics of Theism, edited by Thomas V. Morris, 74–118. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
Garrett, Don. 2002. “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument.” In Spinoza: Metaphysical 
Themes, edited by Olli Koistinen and John Biro, 127–58. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1839. “Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning 
Body (De Corpore, 1655).” In The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. I, 
edited by William Molesworth. London: John Bohn. =DCo.
Hoffman, Paul. 1991. “Three Dualist Theories of the Passions.” Philosophical 
Topics 19: 153–200.
Huenemann, Charlie. 2008. “Epistemic Autonomy in Spinoza.” In Interpreting 
Spinoza: Critical Essays, edited by Charlie Huenemann, 94–110. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
James, Susan. 1997. Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kneale, Martha. 1976. “Leibniz and Spinoza on Activity.” In Leibniz: A Collec-
tion of Critical Essays, edited by Harry G. Frankfurt, 215–37. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press.
174 Valtteri Viljanen
Lear, Jonathan. 1988. Aristotle: The Desire to Understand. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Lin, Martin. 2006. “Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza.” Philosophical 
Review 115 (3): 317–54.
Pasnau, Robert. 2011. Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Plato. 1989. “Sophist. Translated by F. M. Cornford.” In The Collected Dia-
logues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. =Soph.
Rice, Lee C. 1992. “La causalité adequate chez Spinoza.” Philosophiques 19: 
45–60.
Sangiacomo, Andrea. 2015. “The Ontology of Determination, from Descartes to 
Spinoza.” Science in Context 28 (4): 515–43.
Steinberg, Justin. 2016. “Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza’s Account of 
Motivation.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1): 67–87.
Viljanen, Valtteri. 2011. Spinoza’s Geometry of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
